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YELLOW ROWS OF TEST TUBES: DUE PROCESS
CONSTRAINTS ON DISCHARGES OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
BASED ON DRUG URINALYSIS TESTING
DANIEL P. MAZOt
As the problem of employee drug abuse gains increasing attention
from the popular1 and business2 news media, many public and private
employers have instituted medical testing programs to detect drug use
among employees.' In the public sector, large-scale drug screening be-
gan in the United States military in 1981. 4 Currently, agencies at all
levels of government have testing programs; 5 moreover, on September
15, 1986, President Reagan signed Executive Order 12,564 mandating
a drug-free federal workplace and requiring the head of each executive
agency to establish a drug testing program within the parameters of the
executive order.' This order is estimated to affect more than one mil-
lion federal employees.7 Clearly, drug testing is an issue many public
employees now or will soon face.
Drug testing is usually carried out by urinalysis, the easiest and
least expensive method.' However, drug urinalysis testing has gener-
ated much opposition, primarily on the ground that it violates the pri-
vacy rights of the persons tested." This Comment focuses on testing of
t B.A. 1985, University of Virginia; J.D. Candidate 1988, University of
Pennsylvania.
1 See Weisman, 48 Hours on Crack Street: I Was a Drug-Hype Junkie, NEw
REPUBLIC, Oct. 6, 1986, at 14, 15 (describing plethora of feature stories on drug abuse
in major weekly news magazines).
I See Hosty & Elliott, Drug Abuse in Industry: What Does it Cost and What
Can Be Done?, SECURITY MGMT., Oct. 1985, at 53, 55 (discussing the costs of drug
abuse to industry); Klein, Employees Under the Influence-Outside the Law?, PER-
SONNEL J., Sept. 1986, at 57, 59-60 (discussing employer tort liability for the actions of
intoxicated employees).
3 See Note, Drug Testing in the Workplace: A Legislative Proposal to Protect
Privacy, 13 J. LEoss. 269, 270-72 (1986).
, Stille, Drug Testing: The Scene is Set for a Dramatic Legal Collision Between
the Rights of Employers and Workers, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 7, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
' See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (court challenges to drug testing of
state and local government employees); note 41 (same for federal employees).
6 Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987).
See, e.g., A Question of Privacy, Drug Tests Raise a Host of Constitutional
Issues, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 29, 1986, at 18.
8 See M. ROTHsTEIN, MEDICAL SCREENING OF WORKERS 70-71 (1984) (discuss-
ing the expense and frequency of urine tests for marijuana usage).
9 See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. von Raab, 649 F. Supp. 380,
389 (E.D. La. 1986) (drug testing plan violates penumbral privacy rights granted by
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public employees, who are. subject to the protections of the United
States Constitution under the state action doctrine.1" Legal challenges
to public sector testing programs alleging that testing violates the con-
stitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures"1 have
been successful in several employment contexts. 2 Such challenges usu-
ally are resolved by balancing the individual's interest in privacy
against the public interest in having an unimpaired public workforce."
The emerging judicial consensus is that a public employee may be com-
pelled to submit a urine sample when there are reasonable grounds to
suspect that she is using illegal drugs.1 4 In addition, some courts have
held that the sensitive nature of an employee's occupation can severely
diminish her reasonable expectation of privacy. 5
But the legal problems raised by drug testing do not end with the
question of whether or not an employer can test. Many, if not most,
public employees have recognized "property" rights in their jobs.""
Some courts also recognize a liberty interest in one's reputation that can
be damaged by the reporting of a positive drug test result.17 In general,
a public employer cannot deprive its employees of these rights without
due process of law.18 Therefore, even where drug testing is found to be
"reasonable" in light of some state interest, there remains an issue of
whether an employer's actions in response to positive test results are
consistent with the employee's constitutional due process rights.
This Comment argues that the procedural protections presently
available to most public employees who are subject to drug testing are
the Constitution), vacated, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987).
"0 Constitutional freedoms are effective against government agencies, as well as
some private entities acting under state authority; see 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J.
YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 16.3,
at 171-79 (1986) (describing "state action" doctrine). Some of the constitutional issues
discussed in this Comment are relevant to private sector employees who are tested for
drug use under color of state or federal law. See, e.g., Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d
1136, 1138 (3d Cir.) (jockeys at private tracks subject to testing by state racing commis-
sion), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986); 49 C.F.R. § 219 (1986) (Federal Railroad
Administration authorizes railroads to test employees as means of enforcing federal
safety standards).
n U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12 See infra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
s See, e.g., Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264,
1267 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976) (finding that the interest in pro-
tecting the public by ensuring that bus and train operators are fit to perform their jobs
outweighs the employees' privacy interest when testing is done only following accidents
or on suspicion of drug or alcohol use).
14 See infra notes 24-32 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 34-51 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
iS See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
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constitutionally inadequate. Part I discusses the legality of drug testing
based on a fourth amendment analysis, with particular attention to cur-
rent testing programs in the federal government. Part II outlines the
public employee's property and liberty interests upon which drug test-
ing programs may infringe, and frames the issue of what process is due
the drug-tested employee in terms of the Supreme Court's three-part
balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge.1 9 Part II also considers the
Court's rejection of positivist due process analysis in Cleveland Board
of Education v. Loudermill.2 ° Part III discusses the unreliability of
available testing methods and the employee's interest in avoiding being
falsely branded a drug abuser, and proposes more stringent procedural
requirements than have previously been recognized for employer ac-
tions based on positive employee drug test results.
I. THE LEGALITY OF DRUG TESTING OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
If an employer cannot test its employees for drug use, the question
of what process is due those employees who test positive is, of course,
moot. However, a growing body of jurisprudence in state and lower
federal courts indicates that under some conditions public employee
drug testing can withstand constitutional scrutiny. This Part describes
the circumstances under which a public agency can test its employees
for drugs and the prospects for judicial approval of some prominent
newly-proposed testing programs.
A. The Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
of Public Employee Drug Testing
From the earliest case dealing with drug testing of civilian public
employees,2" all courts addressing the issue have recognized urinalysis
tests as "searches" within the meaning of the fourth amendment.2"
Therefore, in order for such tests to be permissible, they must be "rea-
sonable." 23 Courts have analyzed the reasonableness of such searches in
several ways, balancing employee privacy interests against public
safety, workplace safety, and efficiency interests.
19 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
20 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
21 Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
22 See, e.g., McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1307 (8th Cir. 1987) (listing
cases finding urinalysis a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment); Ameri-
can Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 732 (S.D. Ga. 1986)
(same).
23 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
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In general, courts have found drug testing to be constitutional
when there is probable cause or "reasonable suspicion" of drug use. In
Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy,24 Chicago Transit
Authority employees challenged as facially unconstitutional Authority
rules allowing mandatory blood and urine testing, upon the recommen-
dation of two supervisors, of employees involved in vehicle collisions or
suspected of being under the influence of chemicals while on duty.25
The Seventh Circuit found the testing to be reasonable, balancing the
public's interest in safety against the employees' expectations of privacy
and held that "[u]nder these conditions and because 'a valid public in-
terest justifies the intrusion contemplated,' probable cause exists." 2"
When testing is performed absent probable cause or reasonable
suspicion, many courts have found a constitutional violation. In cases
involving police officers,"' fire fighters, 8 and bus drivers and attend-
ants, 9 federal district courts have held drug testing unconstitutional be-
cause it was not done on the basis of a "reasonable suspicion, based on
specific objective facts and the reasonable inferences from those facts in
the light of experience,"30 that urinalysis would produce evidence of
illegal drug use by specific employees. State courts have applied similar
standards and have found fourth amendment violations in cases con-
cerning the random urinalysis of firefighters and policemen, 1 and
school teachers. 2 In addition, the Maryland Attorney General issued
an opinion in 1986 stating that drug testing of a state employee was
24 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
25 See id. at 1267.
28 Id. (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967)).
27 Feliciano v. City of Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (police
cadets); Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (police officer and
court clerk); Penny v. Kennedy, 648 F. Supp. 815, 817 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (police
officers).
"' Loworn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875, 882 (E.D. Tenn. 1986)
(companion case to Penny, 648 F. Supp. 815); Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F.
Supp. 1507, 1517 (D.N.J. 1986).
29 Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1277 v. Sunline Transit Agency, No. CV
86-8270 RG(Gx) (C.D. Cal. July 7, 1987) (bus drivers and transit agency mechanics);
Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1508-09 (D.D.C. 1986) (drug testing of school
bus attendant who was not a driver, without probable cause, was unreasonable).
30 Bostic, 650 F. Supp. at 251.
1 See, e.g., City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322, 1325-26 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1985) (actual testing of firefighters and proposed testing of police officers);
Caruso v. Ward, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789, 791, 799 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (police officers in organ-
ized crime bureau); cf. Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1008-09
(D.C. 1985) (testing of police officers in general is not a violation when regulation
construed to require "a reasonable, objective basis").
32 See Patchogue-Medford Congress of Teachers v. Board of Educ., 119 A.D.2d
35, 35, 505 N.Y.S.2d 888, 889 (App. Div. 1986), affd, No. 156 (N.Y. June 9, 1987)
(WESTLAW, NY-CS database; LEXIS, NY library, NY file).
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valid only where there was a "reasonable, objective basis" for sus-
pecting her of illegal drug use."3
More troublesome are cases in which courts have upheld drug
testing absent reasonable suspicion. These courts have found a dimin-
ished expectation of privacy based, not on a specific suspicion that an
employee is using drugs, but on the general nature of the employee's
job. For example, in Shoemaker v. Handel" the Third Circuit upheld
the random testing of jockeys by the New Jersey Racing Commission.
There was no reasonable suspicion or issue of public safety as in Divi-
sion 241.85 Instead, the court relied on the administrative search excep-
tion to the warrant requirement carved out by the Supreme Court for
heavily regulated industries, and held that the heavy regulation of horse
racing to maintain the appearance and reality of integrity diminished
the jockeys' reasonable expectations of privacy and justified a random
testing program."6
Shoemaker has been called "enigmatic" and has been "rejected or
distinguished by all of the courts that have dealt with the mandatory
drug testing of law enforcement personnel. '37 However, it has been
cited favorably by some courts. For example, in McDonell v. Hunter"
the Eighth Circuit held that prison officials could test "uniformly or by
systematic random selection" those employees who had regular contact
with inmates in medium or maximum security prisons.39 The court al-
lowed testing absent a warrant or reasonable suspicion based, not on
the heavy regulation of the industry as in Shoemaker, but on an institu-
tional interest in prison security. The court noted prison guards' dimin-
ished expectations of privacy because of the sensitive nature of their
jobs,' 0 and stated its belief that blanket testing is an intrusion that "so-
ciety will accept as reasonable."' 1
33 86 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 055 (1986) (WESTLAW, MD-AG database).
795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
15 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. -
36 Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1142 (citing Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602-05
(1981) (warrantless inspection of coal mines); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311,
316-17 (1972) (gun selling); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72,
76-77 (1970) (liquor industry)).
17 American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726, 734
(S.D. Ga. 1986).
38 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
*1 Id. at 1308 (modifying district court's order enjoining urinalysis of correction
employees except on reasonable suspicion and finding the uniform or random testing of
prison employees constitutional); see also Rushton v. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist., 653
F. Supp. 1510, 1524-25 (D. Neb. 1987) (finding the administrative search exception
applicable to the drug testing of persons working at a nuclear power plant).
40 See McDonell, 809 F.2d at 1306.
"I Id. at 1308. This language refers to Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967), establishing the test for determining what
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Similarly, when considering a Customs Service program of testing
applicants for certain security-sensitive positions, one Fifth Circuit
judge questioned the validity of the reasonable suspicion requirement
for any law enforcement personnel. Concurring with the majority opin-
ion, which denied a stay of an injunction against drug testing absent
reasonable suspicion, Judge Higginbotham remarked that,
given the practice of testing and background checks required
for so many government jobs, whether any expectations of
privacy by these job applicants were objectively reasonable is
dubious at best. Certainly, to ride with the cops one ought to
expect inquiry, and by the surest means, into whether he is a
robber.42
Judge Higginbotham was not on the panel when the Fifth Circuit
decided the merits of the case, National Treasury Employees Union v.
von Raab.43 Although the majority vacated the district court's injunc-
tion against the testing, it departed somewhat from Judge Higginbot-
ham's reasoning. The court noted that the "power to take those steps
necessary to carry on the business of government is not, of course, with-
out limits. . . . [T]he government cannot, therefore, undertake searches
of its employees simply by making consent a condition of employ-
ment."'44 The von Raab court further stated that a purely administra-
tive search was "not per se reasonable." But it held, after weighing
the need for the test against its intrusiveness, that drug testing of em-
ployees seeking positions in drug law enforcement was reasonable even
absent individualized suspicion. The court thus held that the nature of
the job applied for diminished the employees' reasonable expectations
of privacy.48 This conclusion was based partly on the position's being a
sensitive one,4' and partly on its being analogous to -a job in a heavily
privacy interests are protected by the fourth amendment. See McDonell, 809 F.2d at
1306. See also Mack v. United States, 653 F. Supp. 70, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (FBI
agent had diminished expectation of privacy that, coupled with the strong government
interest in keeping agents drug-free, made testing without reasonable suspicion a rea-
sonable search), affld on other grounds, 814 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1987).
"' National Treasury Employees Union v. von Raab, 808 F.2d 1057, 1061 (5th
Cir. 1987) (Higginbotham, J., specially concurring in denial of stay).
43 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987).
44 Id. at 178-179.
45 Id. at 179.
46 Id. at 180 ("Individuals seeking employment in drug interception know that
inquiry may be made concerning their off-the-job use of drugs and that the tolerance
usually extended for private activities does not extend to them if investigation discloses
their use of drugs.").
47 See id. at 173.
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regulated industry.4 In this way, the von Raab decision encompassed
the rationales of both McDonell and Shoemaker.
One case seems to suggest that any employer may test its employ-
ees without probable cause or reasonable suspicion of drug use even if
the employment is not in a heavily regulated industry or a sensitive
position. In Allen v. City of Marietta,4 a district court implied that a
public employer's interest in an efficient workplace always outweighs
an employee's expectation of privacy.50 The reasoning in Allen conflicts
with that in many drug testing cases,5" although the circuit court in
48 See id. at 179-80.
49 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
" The court held that the employees-public utility workers-had no legitimate
expectation of privacy on the job from urinalysis because
the government has the same right as any private employer to oversee its
employees and investigate potential misconduct relevant to the employee's
performance of his duties. Thus, a government employee's superiors might
legitimately search her desk. . . for the proprietary purpose of preventing
future damage to the agency's ability to discharge effectively its statutory
responsibilities.
Id. at 491. Therefore, the court concluded that the city "has a right to make warrant-
less searches of its employees for the purpose of determining whether they are using or
abusing drugs which would affect their ability to perform safely their work with haz-
ardous chemicals." Id. The case could have been decided under the reasonable suspi-
cion standard, because the employees challenging the drug testing had been seen smok-
ing marijuana on the job. See id. at 484.
51 See McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 (D. Iowa 1985) ("There is
no doubt about it-searches and seizures can yield a wealth of information useful to the
searcher. (That is why King George III's men so frequently searched the colonists.)
That potential, however, does not make a governmental employer's search of an em-
ployee a constitutionally reasonable one."), modified, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987),
quoted in Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245, 250 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1986), cited with
approval in Capua v. City of Plainfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1516 (D.N.J. 1986).
Miller, Mandatory Urinalysis Testing and the Privacy Rights of Subject Employees:
Toward a General Rule of Legality Under the Fourth Amendment, 48 U. PITr. L.
REv. 201, 216-17 (1986), states the rule emerging from the cases following Division
241 as requiring that the "employee [be] in a position where the impairment of his or
her faculties presents a clear and present danger to the physical safety of the employee,
another employee, or a member of the public," and that there be reasonable suspicion
that such employee is under the influence while in such position. This rule does not
account for the Allen court's emphasis on the employer's right to search "for the pro-
prietary purpose of preventing future damage to the agency's ability to discharge effec-
tively its statutory responsibilities." Allen, 601 F. Supp. at 491. Although the plaintiffs
in Allen were in safety-sensitive positions, and there was a reasonable suspicion that
they were smoking marijuana on duty, the court did not find these facts necessary to its
decision. Rather, it implied that the city could search any employee who worked with
hazardous materials.
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit's decision in McDonell, written subsequent to
Miller's article, indicated that reasonable suspicion was not needed for urinalysis tests,
assuming the tests were done uniformly or by systematic random selection, where
workplace safety would be endangered by employee drug abuse. 809 F.2d at 1308.
Thus, Miller's rule is more restrictive than some courts are willing to be.
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McDonell cited Allen favorably.52 In fact, the Allen court's reasoning
has been rejected by the Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Ortega.5" In
O'Connor, a case involving the search of an employee's desk and file
cabinets, the Court noted that "[w]e have no occasion in this case to
. . . address the proper Fourth Amendment analysis for drug and alco-
hol testing of employees."" Nonetheless, eight members of the Court
did "reject the contention . . . that public employees can never have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their place of work."
'55
The Court found that the plaintiff in O'Connor did have a reason-
able expectation of privacy in his desk and file cabinets, and five Jus-
tices found that he had such an expectation in his office as a whole."
However, the Court reversed the court of appeals' summary judgment
that the search in question was unreasonable.5 If an employee has a
legitimate expectation of privacy in her workplace, it follows that she
has at least an equal expectation of privacy in her bodily fluids. The
plurality in O'Connor suggested that, when such an expectation exists,
the proper standard for initiating a warrantless search is reasonable
suspicion.58 The plurality also held that even when no warrant was
required, "both the inception and the scope of the [search] must be
reasonable."'59
However, the plurality noted that, "[g]iven the great variety of
work environments in the public sector, the question of whether an em-
ployee has a reasonable expectation of privacy must be addressed on a
case-by-case basis."' This language indicates that the Court may be
receptive to warrantless searches absent reasonable suspicion when the
employees' expectations of privacy are diminished, as in Shoemaker and
McDonell.
So far the three courts of appeals that have considered the consti-
tutionality of public employee drug testing have upheld it despite the
absence of reasonable suspicion in the three situations presented. Even
52 See McDonell, 809 F.2d at 1308.
53 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987).
" Id. at 1504 n.*.
55 Id. at 1498; see also id. at 1508 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's
concurring opinion generally supports the Allen approach, stating that searches that
would be regarded as "reasonable and normal" in the private sector do not violate the
fourth amendment. Id. at 1506 (Scalia, J., concurring).
" See id. at 1498-99; see also id. at 1505 (Scalia, J., concurring) (fourth amend-
ment covered office), 1510 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (same).
57 Id. at 1504.
58 Id. at 1503 ("Ordinarily, a search of an employee's office by a supervisor will
be 'justified at its inception' when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.").
59 Id. (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985)).
60 Id. at 1498.
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if the Supreme Court eventually overrules drug testing in some or all of
the situations presented in Shoemaker, McDonell, and von Raab, the
existing case law makes it clear that a public employer may require an
employee to submit to drug urinalysis when there is a reasonable suspi-
cion of drug use, although it is uncertain just what constitutes "reason-
able suspicion."" Further, until the Supreme Court rules on employee
drug testing, in some jurisdictions employees whose impairment would
present a danger to public or workplace safety may be tested even ab-
sent objective grounds supporting a suspicion of drug use.62 It may be
some time before a nationwide standard emerges for determining the
constitutionality of drug testing. Meanwhile, we must look at the legal-
ity of current testing programs in light of the various existing judicial
approaches to the issue.
B. Fourth Amendment Analysis of Current Programs
For several years, federal agencies concerned with transportation
safety have been authorized to test employees for drug use. These regu-
lations have generally required some reasonable basis to believe an em-
ployee is impaired on the job before she can be tested.6 3 Executive Or-
der 12,564," issued in September 1986, seeks to extend such testing to
"' See Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245, 248 (N.D. Ga. 1986) (question of
fact existed as to whether there was reasonable suspicion, where police chief had been
informed by one officer that another officer had been seen smoking marijuana, the
second officer was tested four months later, and the record was unclear whether the
chief had received any information suggesting officer's drug use during intervening four
months); King v. McMickens, 501 N.Y.S.2d 679, 680 (App. Div. 1986) ("reasonable
suspicion" came from an informant who alleged petitioners were involved in illegal
drug activities).
62 See supra notes 34-52 and accompanying text. A district court has held that
urinalysis is sufficiently more intrusive than the search at issue in O'Connor that the
reasonable suspicion standard should apply even to police cadets. Feliciano v. City of
Cleveland, 661 F. Supp. 578 (N.D. Ohio 1987); see also Amalgamated Transit Union,
Local 1277 v. Sunline Transit Agency, No. CV 86-8270 RG(Gx) (C.D. Cal. July 7,
1987) (random testing of bus drivers and mechanics, absent reasonable suspicion, vio-
lates fourth amendment). But see Mullholland v. Department of the Army, 660 F.
Supp. 1565 (E.D. Va. 1987) (upholding testing of civilian employees maintaining heli-
copters to be used in evacuating national leaders in case of emergency); National Ass'n
of Air Traffic Specialists v. Dole, 2 Indiv. Empl. Rts. Cas. (BNA) 68 (D. Alaska 1987)
(using analysis similar to that of the plurality in O'Connor, random testing of air traf-
fic controllers is reasonable under the fourth amendment).
63 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 91.11 (d) (1987) (airline pilots may be required to submit
drug test results when there is "reasonable basis to believe" they have used any drug
that would affect the user's faculties contrary to safety); 49 C.F.R. § 219.301(c)(2)(i)
(1986) (reasonable suspicion for urine test means the concurrence of two supervisory
employees as to need for test).
" 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987).
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employees in all executive agencies in the federal government.6 5 Specifi-
cally, the order authorizes the head of each executive agency to test an
employee for illegal drug use when "there is a reasonable suspicion
that any employee uses illegal drugs,"6 or as part of the investigation
of an accident or unsafe work practice.6 This policy accords with even
the most restrictive judicial rulings on drug testing. But the order also
requires each agency head to establish a program for testing any em-
ployees in broadly defined "sensitive positions," with the agency head
to determine the conditions and manner of testing.
8
Executive Order 12,564 was intended to have, and probably will
have, significance beyond the federal workforce.6 9 Therefore, the per-
missibility of testing programs developed by its authority will affect all
drug testing of public employees. The order's most questionable provi-
sion, that dealing with employees in "sensitive positions," could be up-
held under the rationales of Shoemaker and McDonell. With respect to
any of the employees falling under this provision, the government could
advance a public safety interest in avoiding impairment at least as great
as the interest on which the racing commission relied in Shoemaker.0
And, as in McDonell and von Raab, it is quite possible that many
courts would find a diminished expectation of privacy among these em-
ployees such that blanket or random testing would not be deemed an
unreasonable search." In addition, this provision seems to be exactly
65 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987). The order applies to employees in any "employing unit
or authority of the Federal government" except for the armed forces, Postal Service,
Postal Rate Commission, and the judicial and legislative branches. Id.
66 Id. Read literally, this provision means that the agency can test any employee if
there is reason to suspect that any employee uses illegal drugs; the suspicion need not
be reasonable as to the specific employee being tested. The fact sheet issued with the
order is clearer, stating that an employee can be tested "when there is a reasonable
suspicion that the employee uses illegal drugs." See Executive Order Fact Sheet, 24
Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1299 (1986).
7 Executive Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987). An agency can also demand
a test as a follow-up to counselling or rehabilitation as part of an Employee Assistance
Program. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 192-95.
"8 Id. A sensitive position is one in several *prescribed categories, including any
position filled by presidential appointment. It may also be any position "that the agency
head determines involve[s] law enforcement, national security, the protection of life and
property, public health or safety, or other functions requiring a high degree of trust and
confidence." Id.
6" The order's preamble states, "[t]he Federal government, as the largest employer
in the Nation, can and should show the way towards achieving drug-free workplaces
...." Id. The Reagan administration's promotion of drug testing was influencing
other government bodies even before Executive Order 12,564 was issued. See L.A.
County to Consider Random Drug Testing, 24 Gov't EmpI. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 1193
(1986) (county supervisors inspired by Reagan speech to subject themselves to drug
testing as part of general program of screening county employees).
70 See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
7 See supra notes 40, 46 and accompanying text.
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the type of drug testing which Judge Higginbotham would find
reasonable. 2
Assuming that all or part of the testing required by the order is
consistent with the fourth amendment, the procedures it prescribes
before and after testing become important. Thus far, only the Depart-
ments of Defense, Transportation, and Justice have announced pro-
grams to comply with Executive Order 12,564." The Defense and
Transportation plans could probably withstand fourth amendment at-
tack under the reasoning of Shoemaker and McDonell, since they allow
for testing only when there is reasonable suspicion or when the em-
ployee's position has a direct effect on safety or security. 4 However, a
district court has enjoined a Defense Department program of testing
civilian employees devised prior to the release of Executive Order
12,564. The court in American Federation of Government Employees
v. Weinbergere5 ruled that it would permit testing of civilian police
officers on the base in question only where there was reasonable suspi-
cion or "where accidents involving government property have oc-
curred." The opinions in O'Connor leave open both the possibility
that no warrantless drug testing will be allowed without reasonable
suspicion, and the possibility that the Supreme Court may adopt an
analysis of drug testing similar to that in McDonell.
7
7
Even if the courts were to abandon the approaches of Shoemaker,
MeDonell, and von Raab somewhat, there is another theory under
which blanket or random drug testing could be found constitutional. In
the context of an "administrative search," the Supreme Court has held
that the general need to inspect buildings for fire and health hazards
can be weighed in determining whether there is probable cause to issue
a warrant for an individual building.78 The Court also has stated that,
72 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
" See 52 Fed. Reg. 1340 (1987) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. § 60(a)) (Defense
Department's proposed rules essentially tracking the language of Executive Order
12,564); Dole Order Says 26,500 DOT Workers Will Be Subject to Random Checks,
25 Gov't EmpI. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 88 (Jan. 26, 1987) (Department of Transportation
order requiring testing on demand for air traffic controllers and other employees whose
jobs have direct impact on public health and safety, protection of life and property, or
national security; all employees to be tested as part of annual physical, or if under
reasonable suspicion, or as part of accident investigation); 52 Fed. Reg. 2118-21 (1987)
2118 (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. § 219) (announcement of Transportation Depart-
ment's informal safety inquiry into alcohol and drug use in railroad operations); Quick
Challenge Likely to Drug-Testing at Justice, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 23, 1987, at 5, col. 1.
7' See supra text accompanying note 62.
71 651 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986).
76 Id. at 739.
7 See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
78 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 535-37 (1967).
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though a warrantless search for violations of occupational safety rules is
unconstitutional, entitlement to a warrant does not depend on probable
cause to believe that a violation exists on a particular site.79 Based on
such reasoning, a government agency might obtain a warrant to test
individual employees by showing a need to detect drug use in order to
enforce workplace safety regulations.80 Such testing would differ from
that allowed in Shoemaker, McDonnell, and von Raab mainly in that
it would require that a judge rule on the need for it before rather than
after the fact."1
Though many courts may not go as far as the Allen court did and
hold that an agency's ability to discharge its statutory duty always out-
weighs an employees privacy interest,82 they might agree that the gen-
eral danger posed by drugs in some workplaces is sufficient probable
cause to warrant a search of each employee. It should be noted, how-
ever, that random or blanket testing allowed by such warrants would
require guidelines limiting the discretion of the people conducting the
tests, especially with regard to the selection of employees to be tested. 3
7 Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1978) (investigation of Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act violations).
80 That showing of a need to detect drug use might require evidence of a drug
problem at the particular workplace rather than a showing of a drug problem in society
in general. See McDonell, 809 F.2d at 1311 (Lay, C.J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) ("Neither the environment of the prison workplace nor a well-meant desire
to stem the use of illicit drugs should be used to tip the balance of Fourth Amendment
interests in favor of the state without factual findings on the record to prove the institu-
tion's real needs.").
" The Camara Court cited three factors supporting the reasonableness of the
area search in question in that case. One of these factors, that the searches were
"neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime," Camara,
387 U.S. at 537, does not apply to drug urinalysis testing. Another factor was the "long
history of judicial and public acceptance" of area house safety inspections. Id. While
drug testing may not have such a history, neither does it have a long history of public
disapproval. It is simply a phenomenon that has not existed long enough for there to be
a "historical" public attitude toward it. Finally, the Camara Court noted that "the
public demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or abated, yet it is doubtful
that any other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable results." Id. This factor
seems directly applicable to urinalysis for drug use.
The reasoning of Camara could support a general warrant for drug testing if the
issuing judge accepts, as the von Raab court did, that urinalysis is less intrusive than
an invasion of the home. von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 177 (5th Cir. 1987). A court could
still grant this kind of warrant in some situations while remaining more skeptical of the
reasonableness of drug urinalysis than were the Shoemaker, McDonell, and von Raab
courts.
62 Allen, 601 F. Supp. at 491.
8 Cf Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (random spot checks to de-
tect invalid vehicle registrations violate the fourth amendment). There is language in
Justice White's opinion in Prouse that supports blanket searches. "This holding does
not preclude the State of Delaware . . . from developing methods for spot checks that
involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion.
Questioning all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative." Id.
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Provided that such safeguards are present, an administrative search
warrant is one more means by which public employers can evade
fourth amendment objections to testing of their employees for drug use.
Whether an employer tests only on reasonable suspicion, on an
employee's reduced expection of privacy, or on an administrative search
warrant, it should be apparent that constitutional challenges to drug
testing itself are likely to be unsuccessful in many employment contexts.
Therefore, many public employees will continue to be subject to
mandatory drug testing. The next Part discusses how due process con-
siderations come into play when such employees are tested.
II. DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE
The fifth and fourteenth amendments provide that no person shall
be deprived of "life, liberty, or property" without due process of law."
The Supreme Court has arrived at an understanding of how one ac-
quires a "property" right in one's status vis-a-vis the government-that
is, one's position in a legal relationship to the government. The Court
is less clear, however, on what government actions, other than actual
confinement, infringe protected liberty interests. This Part sets out the
property and liberty interests that are at stake when a public agency
takes action against its employees on the basis of a drug test. It then
describes the analysis the Supreme Court has prescribed for determin-
ing what procedures the due process clauses require in a given
situation.
A. Employment as "Property"
Until the 1950's, courts recognized a distinction between "rights"
stemming from the text of the Constitution or the common law, and
"privileges" granted by the government.85 The latter, including posi-
tions in government service, could be removed without recourse on the
part of the holder.86
See also Shoemaker, 795 F.2d at 1143 (fact that scheme of tests leaves administrator
with no discretion one of factors in reasonableness of search). It has been suggested that
a proper standard for allowing warrantless drug testing is that of "business emer-
gency." An employer would be allowed to test if an employee objectively appeared to be
under the influence and the nature of the employee's work made it likely that chemical
impairment would cause. injury. See Note, Urinalysis and the Public Em-
ployer-Another Well-Delineated Exception to the Warrant Requirement?, 39 OKLA.
L. RE V. 257, 272-73 (1986).
' U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
85 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw 509-10 (1978).
6 See McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517,
517-18 (1892) (where policeman challenged firing on first amendment grounds, he
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The end of the right-privilege distinction was gradual, but it was
effectively complete by 1967.8' This change in the Court's view of the
government's relations with individuals was of course necessary for the
development of today's due process protection of employment rights.
But it was not sufficient without some legal doctrine by means of which
employees could enforce their rights in court.88 The appearance of the
"entitlement" theory-the idea that the holder of a governmentally be-
stowed benefit has rights in that benefit analogous to traditional rights
in real and personal property-was also a needed step. The entitlement
theory emerged with Charles Reich's article, The New Property, in
1964,89 and the Supreme Court applied it in Goldberg v. Kelly90 in
1970, where it held that a welfare recipient was entitled to an eviden-
tiary hearing before his benefits were terminated.
It soon developed that where state positive law created an expecta-
tion of tenure in one's public job, the constitutional guarantee of due
process governed the manner in which this tenure could be removed. 9'
Until recently it was unclear whether that guarantee had any content
outside the procedural provisions of the positive law that created the
entitlement in the first place. Justice Rehnquist, writing for a plurality
of three in Arnett v. Kennedy,92 stated that the law establishing a prop-
erty right also established the process that was due on its removal.
Wayne Kennedy, the plaintiff in Arnett, was fired on the author-
ity of a federal statute providing that civil service employees could only
be dismissed for cause, but were not entitled to a hearing until after
they were discharged. The plurality held that Kennedy had a limited
property right in his job that "was itself conditioned by the procedural
limitations which had accompanied the grant of that interest." 3 On the
"may have a constitutional right to talk politics but he has no constitutional right to be
a policeman"). See also Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 57-58, 65 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
affd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (fifth amendment does not
restrict President's right to remove any government employee suspected of disloyalty
without any explanatory notice).
8'7 See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968) (reviewing and evaluating the
means by which the Supreme Court has avoided the consequences of the right-privilege
distinction).
" See Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in
the Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 446-49 (1977) (describing demise
of right-privilege distinction and noting that it did not afford person whose benefit was
removed the means to discover whether it was removed unconstitutionally or not).
89 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
90 397 U.S. 254, 266-71 (1970).
9'1 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-79 (1972); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-601 (1972).
92 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
93 Id. at 155. Justice Rehnquist's opinion stated that "where the grant of a sub-
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other hand, six Justices maintained that once the government created
the property interest, procedural rights attached that were independent
of the law creating the interest.94
The Court appears to have settled the issue in Cleveland Board of
Education v. Loudermill.9 5 Writing for eight Justices, Justice White
concluded:
'Property' cannot be defined by the procedures provided for
its deprivation any more than can life or liberty. The right to
due process 'is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by con-
stitutional guarantee. While the legislature may elect not to
confer a property interest in [public] employment, it may not
constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest,
once conferred, without appropriate procedural
safeguards.' 6
The Court held that two school district employees had been denied due
process because they were fired, under an Ohio civil service statute,
without a pretermination opportunity to respond to the charges against
them.
9 7
B. The Public Employee's Liberty Interest
While it is fairly settled as to how a property right in a public job
can be created,98 an employee's job status is not the only interest at
stantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which
are to be employed in determining that right, [an employee] ... must take the bitter
with the sweet." Id. at 153-54. This position received some support in Bishop v. Wood,
426 U.S. 341, 343-47 (1976) (no property right exists where state law first requires
some guarantee of permanence, and statute creating interest merely prescribes proce-
dures to be followed in effecting discharge).
" Justice Powell and Blackmun concurred in part and concurred in the result in
part, 416 U.S. at 167, but did not join the "bitter with the sweet" part of the majority
opinion, see supra note 93; Justice White concurred with part of the majority opinion
and dissented in part, 416 U.S. at 188; Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion
joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, id. at 211.
" 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
Id. at 541 (quoting Arnett, 416 U.S. at 167 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
concurring in result in part)).
9 Id. at 547. The fact that Loudermill involved a state rather than a federal
statute helps somewhat to explain the difference in result between this case and Arnett.
Justices Powell and Blackmun probably gave greater weight to the judgment of Con-
gress than to that of the Ohio legislature in determining whether the process available
under the statute was all that was "due." See Arnett, 416 U.S. at 169 n.4 (noting
federal government's general policy of not giving pretermination evidentiary hearings,
emphasizing federal government's efficiency interest).
8 See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (property interest must
be grounded in some form of positive law); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601
(1972) (property interest in a job can arise from "mutually explicit understandings"
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stake when discipline or discharge is based on a drug test. The Su-
preme Court has recognized that marking a citizen with a "badge of
infamy" infringes her liberty and thus implicates the due process
clause.99 In fact, the Loudermill opinion mentioned the restrictive effect
a wrongful discharge can have on an employee: "While a fired worker
may find employment elsewhere, doing so will take some time and is
likely to be burdened by the questionable circumstances under which he
left his previous job." °°
The Supreme Court in Paul v. Davis'0' held that publishing a
citizen's name on a list of "known shoplifters" did not deprive him of
his liberty because applicable state law did not "vouchsafe" any right to
enjoyment of one's reputation. Since the plaintiff's legal status did not
change, his liberty was not taken away.'0 2 But such considerations ap-
pear not to have guided the Loudermill Court. The Court noted that
there was no deprivation-of-liberty claim since no adverse information
about Loudermill had been published. It did not question whether
Loudermill had a liberty interest at all in his reputation.'
The Court simply could have been trying to avoid addressing an
issue it did not have to decide, since Loudermill obtained relief on other
grounds. Alternatively, the Court, by not applying Paul when it could
have, may have demonstrated doubts about that case's general validity.
The latter interpretation is consistent with Professor Tribe's criticism
between employer and employee); see also McLaurin v. Fischer, 768 F.2d 98, 102 (6th
Cir. 1985) (doctor had property right in directorship of department if he had "explicit
understanding" with state that position would be permanent or if "common law" prac-
tice existed whereby directorships were treated as permanent). In general, an employee
who can only be fired "for cause" has a property interest, see, e.g., Gurish v. McFaul,
801 F.2d 225, 226 (6th Cir. 1986); Jungels v. Pierce, 638 F. Supp. 317, 320 (N.D. Ill.
1986). Some public employees are "at will," and have no property rights to their jobs.
See, e.g., Mack v. United States, 653 F. Supp. 70, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (FBI agent),
affd, 814 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1987); McDonald v. Krajewski, 649 F. Supp. 370, 378
(N.D. Ind. 1986) (court employee serving "at the pleasure of" judge).
11 See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971) (posting person's
name as one to whom liquor may not be sold because of drinking problem is depriva-
tion requiring due process); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 427-28 (1969) (when
labor-management inquiry board makes finding of guilt of crime, due process impli-
cated); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1952) (state cannot bar one-time
members of subversive groups from state employment without distinguishing innocent
association from knowing association).
100 Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543.
1o1 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
102 Id. at 712.
108 Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 547 n.13 (Loudermill did not suffer loss of liberty
through accusation hanging over his head for nine months before hearing, as there was
no evidence that the reason for his firing-dishonesty in filling out his job applica-
tion-was published). See Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1505 (D.D.C. 1986)
(even though employer did not make finding of drug use public, such finding remained
available for automatic publication to any prospective future employer).
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of Paul as departing significantly from precedent concerning the liberty
interest in one's reputation.'0
The District of Columbia Circuit has indicated that Paul does not
preclude a deprivation of liberty claim by a discharged employee. The
plaintiff in Doe v. Department of Justice'0 5 was discharged for alleged
unprofessional and dishonest conduct. The court stated that she did
state a claim of deprivation of liberty because the charges stigmatized
her and effectively precluded her from future government
employment.1 06
Damaging an employee's reputation is not the only way a termi-
nation decision can deprive her of liberty. The concept of self-determi-
nation, a vital part of political liberty, is a reflection of the moral value
of individual dignity."' If the state denies a person any means of influ-
encing decisions that affect her, it denigrates the value of that person as
an individual. Therefore, freedom from arbitrary administrative deci-
sions, or the right to procedural protections, safeguards personal dignity
and can be seen as a substantive liberty right.1 08
There may be another constitutionally-protected interest in one's
job. Depriving someone of her job impairs her ability to enjoy life, thus,
arguably, implicating the "life" interest that goes hand in hand with
"liberty" and "property" in the due process clauses.'0 9 Like the sub-
stantive right to freedom from arbitrary administrative decisionmaking,
this "life interest" in employment has not received judicial recognition.
However, constitutional analysis has often changed as new social insti-
tutions, not contemplated by earlier interpretation, have appeared." 0
104 See L. TRIBE, supra note 85, at 527-29; see also Monaghan, Of "Liberty"
and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. REv. 405, 426-27 (1977) (Paul cuts against our
political and constitutional tradition).
105 753 F.2d 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
106 See id. at 1104-05.
107 See L. TRIBE, supra note 85, at 560; Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due
Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three
Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28, 49-50 (1976).
108 See Mashaw, supra note 107, at 50.
109 See Brief for Cross-Petitioner at 23-24, Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (No.
83-6392) (tracing history of concept of liberty from Magna Carta to U.S. Constitution,
concluding that "when Madison wrote the word 'life' in the Bill of Rights, it seems
clear. . . that it was understood . . to mean 'the enjoyment of life,' and that govern-
ment was not to interfere with, impair or deprive a free citizen of his enjoyment of life
without due process of law").
110 See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 489-93 (1954) (application of
equal protection clause to public education must consider the present widespread nature
of public schooling, not the limited social role it played at the time of the enactment of
the fourteenth amendment); see also Rabin, Job Security and Due Process: Monitoring
Administrative Discretion Through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. CHI. L. Rav. 60,
60-62 (1976) (accelerated growth of the public sector and "proliferation of relationships
binding the citizen to the state" from the mid-1950's led to the recognition of the enti-
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The widespread testing of employees' bodily fluids is a phenomenon
unprecedented in our history, as was the wide distribution of govern-
ment benefits Reich described in The New Property.'11 Accordingly, it
would be appropriate for the courts to expand the range of interests
they consider, when determining both whether a deprivation has oc-
curred and what process is due before the government can legally carry
out such a deprivation.
C. Determining What Process is Due:
Mathews v. Eldridge and its Offspring
According to the Supreme Court, the elements of procedural due
process are notice and the opportunity to be heard."' The right to re-
spond to the charges against one arises before the protected interest is
terminated. As the Court made clear in Loudermill, "[tihe tenured
public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the charges
against him, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an oppor-
tunity to present his side of the story.""'  The law creating the pro-
tected interest does not determine what constitutes sufficient opportu-
nity to present the employee's case.""
The required pretermination procedure need not be a full eviden-
tiary hearing in all cases. In determining whether the Constitution re-
quires a given procedure, the Supreme Court in each situation will ap-
ply the balancing test articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge."5 The
analysis considers three interests:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such in-
terest through the procedures used, and the probable value,
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function in-
volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the ad-
ditional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail." 6
tlement theory in Goldberg and the cases that followed it).
"I' See Reich, supra note 89, at 734-39 (describing "government largesse" as a
new form of wealth).
112 See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313
(1950).
113 Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546.
14 Id. at 541 ("[O]nce it is determined that the Due Process Clause applies, the
'question remains what process is due.' The answer to that question is not to be found
in the Ohio statute." (citation omitted)).
115 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
16 Id. at 335.
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Mathews and subsequent Supreme Court decisions show a tendency to
favor the government interest when it is at all substantial, and to find
relatively minimal pretermination procedures constitutionally adequate.
For example, in Schall v. Martin,'" a juvenile defendant was held in
preventive detention pending trial and was denied a hearing to deter-
mine whether there was probable cause to hold him. The state's as-
serted interest in preventing pretrial crime was held to overcome the
suspect's liberty interest in avoiding detention, so that denial of the
probable-cause hearing did not violate due process. 18 In Schweiker v.
McClure,"9 where the government only asserted an interest in cost and
convenience, the Court emphasized the low risk of error as the decisive
factor in its decision not to find a denial of due process. 20 The next
Part argues that in the context of mandatory drug testing, the individ-
ual interests involved combined with the risk of error must be the focus
of the inquiry into what process is due.
III. WHAT PROCESS Is DUE WHEN PUBLIC EMPLOYERS TEST FOR
DRUGS
This Part first looks at the governmental interest in speedy re-
moval of unsatisfactory employees-in this context, those who impair
safety, efficiency, or security by using illegal drugs. While the general
goal of "achieving a drug-free [public] workplace"1 21 does require the
dismissal of employees who are unable or unwilling to stop using
drugs, this goal can still be met regardless of some administrative delay
in the final dismissal of such workers. 22 On the other hand, there is a
117 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
118 Id. at 263.
119 456 U.S. 188 (1982).
120 Id. at 198-200. When the Court has found the state-provided procedure to be
inadequate, it has usually found the state interest branch of the Mathews test to be
especially weak. Compare Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 31-
33 (1981) (emphasizing low risk of error-small likelihood of different result had
counsel been appointed-in parental rights case) and United States v. Raddatz, 447
U.S. 667, 677-81 (1980) (low risk of error when magistrate rules on supression of
evidence) and Board of Curators of University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78,
86 n.3 (1978) (emphasizing Board's interest and low risk of error) with Santosky v.
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-68 (1982) (parental interest in retaining custody and risk
of error outweigh state's fiscal and administrative convenience interests in having low
standard of proof in parental rights termination cases) and Logan v. Zimmerman
Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 435 (1982) (state agency's "insubstantial" interest in avoid-
ing hearing stale claims does not override claimant's right to hearing on merits, where
agency was responsible for failure to hear claim within limitation period) and Mem-
phis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 18 (1978) (utility company re-
quired to give pretermination opportunity to challenge billing error).
121 Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987).
122 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 544 (the government
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strong public interest in quickly removing people from positions where
their impairment can cause immediate public harm.
The Grateful Dead's vision of Casey Jones "Driving that train/
High on cocaine" 123 has become all too true.124 But employee drug
abuse poses dangers other than intoxicated railroad engineers. Recent
revelations of government personnel selling national security informa-
tion purely for profit 25 raise the possibility of employees resorting to
espionage or theft to support expensive drug habits. Safety, efficiency,
and security concerns constitute the governmental-interest side of the
Mathews test. The rest of this section will discuss the risk of error in-
herent in currently available drug testing methods, and the procedures
that will be necessary in order to protect the strong individual interests
jeopardized by these tests.
A. Risk of Error
Several methods of testing urine for the presence of drug metabo-
lites 12 are in widespread use. Not surprisingly, the cheapest and easiest
of these tests to administer, and thus the most often used, are the least
reliable. However, even the most sophisticated methods cannot guaran-
tee 100 percent accuracy, and even when a positive test result is accu-
rate, it is not always clear what that means.127
1. Testing Methods
The easiest and cheapest urinalysis methods are immunoassays,
the most widespread being the Enzyme-Multiplied Immunoassay
Technique ("EMIT") designed by the Syva Corporation,' 28 and the
other being Radioimmunoassay ("RIA") performed with kits available
from several manufacturers. These tests measure the presence of a spe-
cific chemical substance. A portion of the urine specimen is added to a
also has an interest in keeping qualified people at work and off the welfare rolls).
1 R. Hunter, Casey Jones (@Warner Brothers, Inc. 1970).
' See, e.g., Drug Test Failed by 3 at SEPTA after Dec. Crash, Phila. Inq., Jan.
17, 1987, at Al, col. 1 (engineer of one train in commuter rail collision tested positive
for cocaine).
125 See Spy Ring-The Untold Story of the Walker Case, N.Y. Times, June 29,
1986, § 6 (Magazine), at 14. (FBI convinced that espionage operation lasting nearly
20 years motivated only by money).
12 A metabolite is an organic compound produced by the processes involved in the
maintenance of life. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
824 (1979).
137 See infra notes 155-63 and accompanying text.
I2s 2 M. HouTs, R. BASELT & R. CRAVEN, CouRTRooM TOxICOLOGY
§§ 30.01-30.06 (1986) [hereinafter COURTROOM ToxIcoLoGY].
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solution containing an antibody 2 9 and a known drug. If the drug being
sought is present in the urine, it displaces the known drug and binds
itself to the antibody. The amount of the displaced drug is then mea-
sured, yielding the amount of the sought drug in the urine."'
Thin-layer chromatography ("TLC") and gas chromatography
("GC") separate different compounds within the specimen, and identify
them by various characteristics such as the rate at which they react
with another compound.131 These methods require more expensive
equipment and more time than do the immunoassays, and must be done
under laboratory conditions.1 2 Mass spectrometry ("MS") is a highly
sophisticated identification technique that yields a permanent graphic
representation of a compound's characteristics."3 MS is often used in
combination with gas chromatography, forming the GC/MS method.""
2. Reliability of These Methods
Immunoassay tests carry a strong risk of "false positives," or erro-
neous indications that a particular drug is present in the urine. Part of
this risk is attributable to cross-reactivity, or the inability to distinguish
between the drug being measured and other drugs that can cause simi-
lar reactions with the test compound. 5 EMIT has been found to be
ninety-five percent accurate or better in laboratory studies,1 3 and RIA
129 An antibody is a protective material found naturally in the body, or created by
the body's immunological system in response to the introduction of specific foreign
materials. Id. at § 30.0112].
130 See id. at §§ 30.0315], 30.04.
131 See id. at §§ 21.01-21.08, 22.03.
132 See id. at §§ 21.10 (much of ultimate value of TLC test depends on personal
skills of technician), 22.09[4] (good quality control and complete understanding of the
analytical procedures must be present for successful GO). RIA must also be performed
in a licensed laboratory because it uses radioactive materials. Id. at § 30.08. However,
unlike TLC and GC, RIA can be taught to inexperienced technicians. Id. at § 30.07
See also Comment, Admissibility of Biochemical Urinalysis Testing Results for the
Purpose of Detecting Marijuana Use, 20 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 391, 394-95, 397-98
(1984) (discussing gas chromatography tests and problems associated with various labo-
ratory procedures).
133 See COURTROOM TOXICOLOGY, supra note 128, at §§ 23.01-23.05.
134 See R.L. FOLTZ, A. FENTIMAN & R.B. FOLTZ, GC/MS ASSAYS FOR ABUSED
DRUGS IN BODY FLUIDS 1-2 (National Institute on Drug Abuse Research Monograph
No. 32, 1980) [hereinafter GC/MS ASSAYS].
135 COURTROOM ToxIcoLOGY, supra note 128, at § 30.09.
138 See Peranzo v. Coughlin, 608 F. Supp. 1504, 1511 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing
laboratory studies); Abercrombie & Jewell, Evaluation of EMIT and RIA High Vol-
ume Test Procedures For THC Metabolites in Urine Utilizing GCIMS Confirmation,
10 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY 178, 179 [hereinafter Evaluation] (97.3% of samples
tested positive by both EMIT and RIA confirmed by GC/MS); Kogan, Al Razi, Pier-
son & Willson, Confirmation of Syva Enzyme Multiple Immunoassay Technique
(EMIT) d.a.u. and Roche Abuscreen Radioimmunoassay (RIA) Urine Cannabinoid
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has produced similar results.1 17 However, reported experiments do not
necessarily reflect the conditions under which large-scale employee test-
ing is done. Sloppy laboratory practices, such as failure to clean equip-
ment and specimen containers properly, are more likely as the labora-
tory's volume of work increases. A blind study of drug screening labs
by the Centers for Disease Control in 1981 revealed false-positive rates
of up to sixty-six percent for some drugs.1"8 In addition, the Army con-
ceded that 69,000 positive results reported for soldiers in 1982 and
1983 were scientifically "unsupportable." '39 Clearly, reported accuracy
rates do not justify blind faith in screening techniques such as EMIT
and RIA.
Some courts have held that EMIT is reliable enough for a single
positive result to justify disciplining prison inmates.1 4° Others have
found a positive EMIT result confirmed by a second EMIT test to be
sufficiently accurate to satisfy due process in inmate discipline cases.""'
If the court finds as a matter of fact that EMIT is ninety-five percent
accurate, that test meets the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of
proof, which is often the standard in drug discipline cases.1 42 Some
Immunnassays by Gas ChromatographiclMass Spectrometric (GCIMS) and Bonded-
Phase Adsorption/ Thin-Layer Chromatographic (BPA-TLC) Methods, 31 J. FOREN-
sic Sci. 494, 497-98 (1986) [hereinafter Confirmation] (all of samples shown by
EMIT to have some trace of THC confirmed by GC/MS and TLC, and none of
samples known to be absent THC tested positive by EMIT); Sutheimer, Yarborough,
Hepler & Sunshine, Detection and Confirmation of Urinary Cannabinoids, 9 J. ANA-
LYTICAL ToxICOLOGY 156, 158-59 (1985) [hereinafter Detection] (231 of 242 positive
EMIT results-95.4%-confirmed by TLC).
137 See Evaluation, supra note 136, at 179.
138 See Hansen, Caudill & Boone, Crisis in Drug Testing. Results of CDC Blind
Study, 253 J. A.M.A. 2382, 2386 (1985). Most of the labs studied displayed even
higher rates of false negative results, id., indicating that the testing done by those labs
was not accomplishing its purpose of identifying individuals who used drugs.
139 Diamond, Army Veterans May Appeal Drug Test Punishments, 19
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 145, 145 (1985).
110 See Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753, 756 (8th Cir. 1986); Harmon v. Auger,
768 F.2d 270, 276-77 (8th Cir. 1985); Jensen v. Lick, 589 F. Supp. 35, 38-39 (D.N.D.
1984).
14 See Wykoff v. Resig, 613 F. Supp. 1504, 1512 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (EMIT re-
sult was confirmed by TLC, but court stated that second EMIT test "or its equivalent"
was sufficient); Peranzo v. Coughlin, 608 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Crowell v.
Wilkenson, Civ. A. 82-1283 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 1983) (on WESTLAW, DCT
database), affid, 738 F.2d 421 (1984).
142 See Peranzo, 608 F. Supp. at 1512 ("[Tlhe probabilities associated with the
various standards of proof may be fairly estimated as 50+% for preponderance of the
evidence, 70% for clear and convincing evidence, above 80% for clear, unequivocal and
convincing evidence, and 95-+% for evidence beyond a reasonable doubt."), citing
United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 403-06 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (Weinstein, J.),
affd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980); T.
DENENBERG & R. DENENBERG, ALCOHOL AND DRUGS: ISSUES IN THE WORKPLACE
54-57 (1983) (beyond a reasonable doubt is often the standard in drug discipline cases).
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courts, however, are not so trusting of EMIT's accuracy.""4 The conse-
quences of falsely labelling a public employee as an illegal drug user
14
4
require the highest standard of proof in any personnel action based on
urinalysis results.
In such proceedings, positive results of EMIT or RIA tests should
be confirmed by another, more sophisticated, test in order to reduce the
risk of error to an acceptable level. 45 Even the manufacturer of EMIT
recommends confirmation by a separate technique if high accuracy is
desired, specifically mentioning GC.14' TLC is well regarded, also, as a
confirmation technique,'147 though it has disadvantages that militate
against its complete reliability.
4 8
The GC/MS combination is the best method for confirming posi-
tive results. Although each GC/MS test costs considerably more than
an EMIT screening test, 4 19 the technique is more accurate than any
other' 50 and has the advantage of producing a graphic record that an
143 See, e.g., National Treasury Employees' Union v. von Raab, No. 86-3833, slip
op. at 29 (5th Cir. Apr. 22, 1987) (WESTLAW, CTA database; LEXIS, Genfed li-
brary, Usapp File) (EMIT may not be sufficiently reliable without GC/MS confirma-
tion); Higgs v. Wilson, 616 F. Supp. 226 (W.D. Ky. 1985) (upholding injunction of
testing, finding tests sufficiently unreliable to establish likelihood of violation of plain-
tiff's due process rights); Kane v. Fair, 33 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2492 (Mass. Super.
1983) (stating that EMIT can only be used as evidence if confirmed by another method
of analysis). See also Pella v. Adams, 638 F. Supp. 94, 97 (D. Nev. 1986) (denying
summary judgment on due process claim that single EMIT test unreliable); Anable v.
Ford, 653 F. Supp. 22, 44 (W.D. Ark. 1985) (finding the EMIT test insufficiently
"probative of the guilt or innocence of the student to justify its use"); Storms v. Cough-
lin, 600 F. Supp. 1214, 1222 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (substantial question of fact exists re-
garding accuracy of EMIT). Cf. 49 C.F.R. § 219.307(b) (1986) (immunoassay not
acceptable to Federal Railroad Administration as confirmatory test).
144 See infra notes 165-69 and accompanying text. See also Exec. Order. No.
12,564 § 1(c), 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987) ("Persons who use illegal drugs are not suitable for
Federal employment.").
145 See CouRTRooM ToxICOLOGY, supra note 128, at § 30.10[3].
146 See Peranzo, 608 F. Supp. at 1514 n.16.
147 See Confirmation, supra note 136, at 498 (TLC actually showed advantage
over GC/MS); Pe, Use of Descending Thin Layer Chromatography for Identification
of Cannabinoids, 37 BULL. ON NARCOTICS 83, 85 (1985) (a TLC method produced
results "comparable to the results obtained by GC"). See also Wykoff v. Resig, 613 F.
Supp. 1504, 1512 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (court accepts TLC as sufficiently reliable confir-
mation test).
148 See CouRTRooM TOXICOLOGY, supra note 128, at § 21.10. See also Raja-
nanda, Nair & Navaratnam, An Evalutation of TLC Systems for Opiate Analysis, 37
BULL. ON NARCOTICS 35, 38-44 (1985) (finding disparity in effectiveness of different
TLC systems for detecting opiates).
149 See Stille, supra note 4, at 23, col. 4 ($5 for screening test, up to $80 for
"sophisticated confirmation tests"); Comment, supra note 132, at 396 n.60 (MS test for
THC metabolite-indicator of marijuana use-costs approximately $75, with RIA and
GC together approximately $9).
150 See GC/MS ASSAYS, supra note 134, at 1; COURTROOM ToxICOLOGY, supra
note 128, at § 23.07[1].
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independent expert can review.15' But even GC/MS is not free from
error. It is known to misidentify some corm pounds, and the high level of
training required to perform the test makes it all the more likely that a
misidentification will occur.' 52
Given the probability of false positives from immunoassays as
screening tests, failure to confirm such a result through a separate ana-
lytic technique presents an intolerable chance of falsely indicating ille-
gal drug use by an employee. A positive result from one of these tests is
tantamount to an accusation by an informer who is known to lie a
significant percentage of the time. Due process would seem to require
more evidence than that before an employee is terminated. Specifically,
the high degree of reliability desired in such cases requires confirmation
of positive immunoassay results by chromatographic means (as long as
no equally accurate methods have been developed) before final action
can be taken against any employee.' 53 Furthermore, any test used as
the basis for a personnel action must be done in a lab meeting preset
standards for employee training and quality control.' 54 Absent these
conditions, the "risk of error" branch of the Mathews test carries almost
dispositive weight.
3. Interpretation of a True Positive Result
Even if the initial positive result is accurate, or, accurate or not, is
confirmed by further testing, this does not necessarily mean the em-
ployee is the menace to the public safety, or workplace safety, or effi-
ciency that the test is meant to detect. Traces of marijuana remain in
urine for weeks, so it is possible that a positive result for marijuana
indicates off-duty use not affecting the employee's job performance. 5
'5' See McBay, Problems in Testing for Abused Drugs, 255 J. A.M.A. 39, 40
(1986) (letter to the editor).
152 See COURTROOM ToXIOLOGY, supra note 128, at § 23.08 (GC/MS re-
quires a highly trained operator for reliable results); Confirmation, supra note 136, at
499 (GC/MS erroneously found THC in two samples out of 30 tested, perhaps be-
cause of sensitivity of instruments); Comment, supra note 132, at 398 (describing possi-
ble laboratory problems affecting reliability of test).
153 Cf 49 C.F.R. § 219.307(b) (1986) (Federal Railroad Administration effec-
tively requires such confirmation by mandating retesting by a "method capable of pro-
viding quantitative data specific to the drug (or metabolite(s)) detected").
154 See Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224 (1987) (requiring agencies to con-
duct their testing programs subject to technical guidelines promulgated by the Secretary
of Health and Human Services). A house of the New Jersey legislature passed a bill
providing, inter alia, that employees tested for drugs may get their test results checked
by state-approved medical facilities. See N.J. Assembly Passes Law Allowing Drug
Testing of Most Employees, 25 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 41 (Jan. 12, 1987).
'" See Dackis, Pottash, Annitto & Gold, Persistence of Urinary Marijuana
Levels After Supervised Abstinence, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1196, 1197 (1982) [here-
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Although a blood test could confirm intoxication, no urine test can
show how recently marijuana was ingested.'56 On the other hand, there
is speculation that the body retains the psychoactive ingredient of mari-
juana long after the last inhalation, possibly causing impairment for
days after the user notices any effect.'1 7 A test of pilots in a flight simu-
lator showed impairment even twenty-four hours after smoking mari-
juana; one of the pilots, who reported no awareness of any intoxication,
missed the runway completely.' 58
Notwithstanding the disturbing implications of this experiment,
medical findings concerning the duration of the effects of marijuana use
remain inconclusive.' 59 A positive urinalysis result, therefore, is not
conclusive proof that an employee is impaired on the job. Research in-
dicates that urinalysis also cannot discern active smoking of marijuana
and hashish from passive inhalation, or the inhalation of smoke from
the use of the drug by others.' 60 An employee could become impaired
through passive inhalation,' 6 ' and a positive test for marijuana would
not show why she was impaired. But involuntary exposure to the drug
hardly seems to justify discharge or discipline. A nonsmoker can test
positive through EMIT several days after passive inhalation. 6 2 Simi-
larly, ingestion of poppy seeds in food can cause one to test positive for
morphine or heroin, even when TLC or GC/MS is used.' 63 These con-
inafter Urinary Marijuana Levels] ("Urinary excretion of cannabinoids persists for
roughly 3 weeks after supervised abstinence . . . ."); Comment, supra note 132, at
397 (Although THC, the intoxicating ingredient in marijuana, is present only during
the intoxicated state, the THC metabolite, a by-product of THC, remains in the body
for an extended period.).
15I See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 219.309(b)(2) (1986) (the urine test "cannot distinguish
between recent use off the job and current impairment"). If a federal railroad employee
provides a blood test, it removes the presumption of impairment that would result from
a positive urine test. See id.
157 See Urinary Marijuana Levels, supra note 155, at 1197.
158 Yesavage, Leirer, Denari & Hollister, Carry-Over Effects of Marijuana In-
toxication on Aircraft Pilot Performance: A Preliminary Report, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIA-
TRY 1325, 1328 (1985).
'59 Id. at 1328-29 (arguing that further research is needed to define the point
after smoking THC at which impairment ceases).
18I See Morland, Bugge, Skuterud, Steen, Wethe & Kjeldsen, Cannabinoids in
Blood and Urine After Passive Inhalation of Cannabis Smoke. 30 J. FORENSIC SCI.
997, 1001 (1985) [hereinafter Passive Inhalation I] (positive EMIT urinalysis results
three days after passive inhalation). See also Zeidenberg, Bourdon & Nahas, Mari-
juana Intoxication by Passive Inhalation: Documentation by Detection of Urinary Me-
tabolites, 134 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 76, 77 (1977) [hereinafter Passive Inhalation 11]
(cannabinoids found in passive inhaler). But see Perez-Reyes, Reply to Passive Inhala-
tion of Marijuana Smoke, 250 J. A.M.A. 898 (1983) (letter) (challenging Zeidenberg's
experimental method).
161 See Passive Inhalation II, supra note 160, at 77.
162 See id.; Passive Inhalation I, supra note 160, at 1001.
163 See, e.g., Bjerver, Jonsson, Nilsson, Schuberth & Schuberth, Morphine Intake
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siderations militate against attributing great reliability to the drug
urinalysis techniques presently available.
B. The Employee's Interest
An employee whose urinalysis indicates illegal drug use has sev-
eral interests that would be irreparably damaged if she were fired, even
if she were reinstated on a post-termination finding that the urinalysis
result was false. Primarily, she has a property interest in her continued
income, but income is not the only thing at stake. The employee also
has a strong interest in "the continuation of the opportunity to perform
meaningful and fulfilling work."1 4 The importance of these interests
implies a need for full determination of facts before the employee is
discharged.
The fact-finding effort should be careful and serious. A deep
stigma, especially among employers, still attaches to people branded as
drug users.1 6 5 An employee discharged as the result of a drug test could
find herself unable to find work elsewhere because of the circumstances
of her discharge. 66 Accordingly, testing under Executive Order
12,564,67 which purports to set an example for other employers,
should be accompanied by stringent fact-finding. 8 If a person labelled
from Poppy Seed Food, 34 J. PHARMACY & PHARMACOLOGY 798, -800 (1982) (finding
that the poppy seeds in a commerciallly available food contained 5 milligrams of mor-
phine, an amount insufficient to cause noticeable effects, but sufficient to create positive
test results even when TLC is used); Fritschi & Prescott, Morphine Levels in Urine
Subsequent to Poppy Seed Consumption, 27 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 111, 116 (1985)
(differentiation of heroin users from poppy seed eaters apparently requires GC/MS
detection of heroin itself or acetylmorphine in urine).
14 Brief of AFSCME, amicus curiae, at 12, Cleveland Board of Education v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (No. 83-6392).
165 See J. RUBLOWSKY, THE STONED AGE: A HISTORY OF DRUGS IN AMERICA
198-99 (1974) (likening the demonization of drug addicts in America to the treatment
of Jews in Nazi Germany). See also Nelson, Drug Abusers on the Job, 23 J. OCCUPA-
TIONAL MED. 403, 405 (1981) ("The highly negative and prejudicial image of dope
fiends and reefer smokers of the 1940's still prevails in many board rooms.").
166 See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543, quoted supra at text accompanying note 96;
see also Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1505 (D.D.C. 1986) (finding of drug
use by an employee will remain on file for automatic publication to any prospective
employer).
117 See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
16' The order provides that, before a testing program can begin, employees must
receive sixty days' advance notice and an opportunity to submit medical documentation
supporting the legitimate use of specific drugs, or voluntarily to obtain assistance for a
drug problem. In addition, each agency's program must include procedures for retest-
ing, confidentiality, and the retention of test records and specimens. 3 C.F.R. 224
(1987). The procedural requirements discussed infra notes 177-203 and accompanying
text apply to the way in which federal agencies should implement the order and state
agencies should implement their own drug testing programs. The Department of
Health and Human Services announced government-wide guidelines for implementing
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an illegal drug user is "not suitable for [flederal employment," 6 9 other
employers, following the federal government's example, may be reluc-
tant to hire her.
An employee who does not use drugs certainly has an interest in
avoiding this stigma. But it is also possible for a real drug user, even an
addict, to be a completely stable worker.1 70 Since urinalysis "indicates
nothing more than the presence or absence of drugs[,] . . provides no
information about the pattern of use[,1 and cannot distinguish between
the occasional user unfortunate enough to have indulged just before the
test and the chronic abuser," 7 an employee who is never impaired on
the job could erroneously be held responsible for being part of the
"drug problem." Such a branding arguably infringes a liberty
interest.1
This is not to suggest that a properly-confirmed true-positive
urinalysis result cannot raise a presumption that the employee in ques-
tion is impaired in the performance of her duties. Especially if the de-
tected drug is an addictive one, there is at least a substantial possibility
that its use will affect the employee's job performance.173 However, the
very real possibility that such drug use has no adverse effect on the
particular employee's performance means that the presumption should
be rebuttable. If the employee can show that she has never displayed
the poor productivity, unsafe work habits, and other bad traits against
which employee drug testing is meant to protect,174 lumping her to-
gether with those who do exhibit such traits may well be an arbitrary
deprivation of her liberty interest in her reputation.
The stigma accompanying a drug-based firing is not the only con-
sequence of drug testing that can affect an employee's liberty. Liberty is
also affected when the employee has a choice between termination and
the Order in February 1987. Notable among these guidelines was a requirement of
GC/MS confirmation of any positive test result. See ALCOHOL, DRUG ABUSE AND
MENTAL HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL GUIDELINES FOR
DRUG TESTING PROGRAMS (1987), reprinted in 9A Lab. Rel. Rep (BNA) (Indiv.
Empl. Rts. Manual) § 595, at 751, 755 (1987).
16" Exec. Order No. 12,564, § 1(c), 3 C.F.R. 224, 225 (1987).
'7 See Nelson, supra note 165, at 403 (citing documentation of long-term heroin
addicts with long stable work histories); Redfield, Drugs in the Work-
place-Substituting Sense for Sensationalism, 63 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1064, 1065
(1973) (suggesting that the sole practical approach is to consider only those employees
whose drug use impairs their health, work performance, attendance or behavior as be-
ing "drug problems").
M Lewy, Preemployment Qualificative Urine Toxicology Screening, 25 J. OccU-
PATIONAL MED. 579, 579 (1983).
172 See supra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
"I See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text.
171 See Exec. Order No. 12,564, preamble, 3 C.F.R. 224, 224 (1987).
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entering counselling or medical treatment as part of an employee assis-
tance program ("EAP").1" Requiring a person to undergo such treat-
ment invades her personal autonomy, especially when the counselling
or treatment is unnecessary. 7 6 Requiring her to enter such a program
as a condition of keeping her job, without first affording her procedural
protections, forces her to choose between losing her job and accepting a
deprivation of liberty without due process of law. The Supreme Court
has held that the government cannot condition public employment on
the surrender of a constitutional right. 7 ' Thus, before an employer can
force an employee to choose between termination and rehabilitation, the
Constitution requires some kind of fact-finding procedure to confirm
that the employee does, in fact, require rehabilitation. As we shall see
below, once there has been a procedurally adequate finding that an
employee has used drugs, the option of undergoing treatment can be an
indispensable method of determining whether the employee is suitable
for continued employment.
We have seen that there are several employee interests that re-
quire procedural safeguards to protect them from unjustified infringe-
ment. The following section proposes specific measures that are neces-
sary to protect these interests adequately. It also argues that the
phenomenon of drug testing calls for the courts to broaden their analy-
sis of what process is due before the government deprives its employees
of these interests.
C. Proposed Minimum Requirements of Procedural Due Process
This discussion of specific procedural requirements focuses on the
period after a positive initial test result has been obtained. To avoid
stigmatizing an employee undeservedly, the employer should keep posi-
tive test results strictly confidential until a final determination has been
made as to discipline. Since an employee's legal status does not change
except with discharge, it may be that, under Paul v. Davis,178 no notice
or hearing is constitutionally required before the result is published?
175 See infra notes 191-94 and accompanying text.
176 See Stille, supra note 4, at 24, cols. 2, 3 (employee tested positive for cocaine
forced to spend 28 days in clinic despite several negative follow-up tests and statement
of doctors at clinic that no rehabilitation was needed).
177 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967) (free-
dom of association); cf Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (government
cannot condition a public benefit, unemployment compensation, upon the surrender of
a constitutional right, free exercise of religion).
178 424 U.S. 693 (1976); see supra text accompanying notes 101-03.
"' "Publish" in this context has the same meaning as the related concept of pub-
lication in libel law, that is, to make known to third persons. BLACK's LAw DICTIoN-
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Alternatively, it can be argued that Paul was an anomaly and inconsis-
tent with previous cases 80 and that an employee should have the same
kind of hearing before her positive result is announced as she deserves
before being disciplined or fired.
Because of the uncertain reliability of the testing methods and the
relative weight of the employee's interests that are at stake, the afore-
mentioned hearing should include a full opportunity for the employee
to present evidence. The employee should at least have a chance to
show the absence of on-the-job impairment. This will usually be im-
possible to show conclusively, because of the difficulty of proving a neg-
ative. Nonetheless, it may be possible to convince an administrative
decisionmaker that the employee's use of, for example, marijuana, was
an isolated instance that did not affect her work performance. In this
situation, the employee has grounds to argue that termination, or even
harsh discipline, is unnecessary.1 81
In most cases, the real value of an evidentiary hearing is in al-
lowing the employee to impeach the accuracy of the test result. There is
judicial support for the argument that due process requires the em-
ployer to preserve the urine specimen for the employee to have retested
if she so chooses. 182 Submission of a new specimen some time after the
original test would be insufficient to rebut the original test result be-
cause the absence of drug metabolites from the second sample could
indicate merely that the employee stopped taking drugs until retesting.
Therefore, there is value in preserving the original specimen for
retesting.
The requirement of a pretermination hearing does not mean that
bus drivers who test positive for drug use must remain on duty
throughout the administrative process. But even when public safety ar-
gues for an employee's removal with a minimum of delay, suspension
or transfer to a less sensitive position pending a final determination
would be more consistent with due process than would summary
discharge. 88
On the issue of whether the employee actually used drugs, the
ARY 1105 (5th ed. 1979).
180 See supra note 104.
181 See Kruger v. Department of Justice, 32 M.S.P.B. 71, 77 (1987) (discharge
based on detected marijuana use reduced to sixty-day suspension according to the policy
underlying Executive Order 12,564).
I See Banks v. FAA, 687 F.2d 92, 95 (5th Cir. 1982).
183 See Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1507 (D.D.C. 1986); see also
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 194 (1974) (White J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) (suspension with pay would obviate the problems caused by delay in
the termination of a potentially disruptive employee).
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standard of proof at the hearing should be high, notwithstanding a ten-
dency to demand a relatively low measure of proof in the private sector.
Arbitrators are often faced with challenges to the discharge of employ-
ees based on contractual prohibitions of drug use. Many arbitrators in
drug-related discipline cases merely require that they be "convinced"
that the grievant in fact used drugs, usually meaning by a preponder-
ance of the evidence." 8 But some interpret this standard as being the
same as "clear and convincing evidence" in other contexts. 185 The stan-
dard can be somewhat lower when there will be an immediate public
safety risk if the employee is in fact impaired. 8 ' This arbitration ap-
proach, dealing mainly with private employers, does not consider the
exceptional relationship between a government agency and its employ-
ees. The relation of the government to an individual has implications
for personal liberty that are absent from the private-sector employment
relationship."8 ' The special nature of the government-individual rela-
tionship means that the government must act with a higher degree of
certainty than does a private employer when it deprives a citizen of a
state-created interest.
The degree of certainty must be especially high when the depriva-
tion is based on a finding that the employee has committed an illegal
act. 88 Accordingly, a public employer should bear the burden of prov-
ing drug use by a standard that at least approaches "beyond a reasona-
ble doubt." A urinalysis result can meet this standard only if accompa-
nied by recorded quantitative evidence, such as a chromatograph or
14 See T. DENENBERG & R. DENENBERG, supra note 142, at 54-56. See also
Kroger Co. v. BCTWU Local No. 372-A, 86-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8407
(June 19, 1986) (Wren, Arb.) (Where the grievant was fired for using cocaine on the
job, the arbitrator declined to apply a standard of proof higher than to a preponderence
because use of cocaine was not malum in se. The arbitrator distinguished this situation
from those in which an employee discharged, for example, for dishonesty or theft would
have difficulty finding other employment. This may have been an unrealistic view of
the position of an announced drug user in the job market.).
185 Chase Bag Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Local 377T,
87-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8001 (May 24, 1986) (Strasshofer, Arb.).
186 Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Local 922, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters,
82 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 150, 152 (December 19, 1983) (Bernhardt, Arb.).
187 See Reich, supra note 89, at 785.
8 See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 427-31 (1969) (Plaintiffs stated a
cause of action for a due process violation where administrative board made findings of
criminal guilt without affording the individuals in question the full right to cross-ex-
amine witnesses. The Court remanded to the district court to determine whether due
process required that all the procedural protections available to a criminal defendant be
present in the administrative proceeding.); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 488
(1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result) (if administrative body were accusing
individuals of illegal activity, "the rigorous protections relevant to criminal prosecutions




mass spectrum, showing compounds in the urine with characteristics
unique to the particular drug in question. Along with the chance to
retest the urine specimen itself,"8 9 the employee must have the opportu-
nity to inquire into the testing procedure to evaluate whether proper
laboratory techniques were used. 90
The above procedure only applies to proof of past drug use. To
avoid merely punitive use of drug testing, due process requires a dem-
onstration that the employee will continue to be a threat to the em-
ployer's legitimate interests. Proving that the employee used drugs does
not necessarily mean that she will be such a threat. But even if proof of
drug use raises a presumption of continued impairment, an employee
must have adequate opportunity to rebut this presumption. We will
now examine a procedural requirement that would serve the purposes
of the due process guarantee while respecting both the public and indi-
vidual interests that employee drug testing affects.
The federal government and many private businesses provide pro-
grams for employees to get counselling or other treatment for chemical
dependency."" These employee assistance programs, or EAPs, have
been found to save employers money by improving productivity and
employee morale. Instead of firing an employee who has a drug prob-
lem and hiring an untrained replacement, the business gets back the
experienced employee after rehabilitation. 92 Arbitrators sometimes
hold that when an employer has an EAP, an employee found to be
using drugs must have the option of entering rehabilitation rather than
being dismissed. 9
Such a requirement with regard to public employees is sound pub-
lic policy. It serves the agency's, and thus the public's, interest in re-
taining experienced personnel, and it furthers the employee's interests
* See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
o See Banks v. FAA, 687 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1982) (due process requires
greater opportunity to inquire into testing procedures and cross-examine laboratory di-
rector when urinalysis results were the only evidence leading to discharges). It may not
be necessary to afford an employee the most stringent procedural safeguards when she
has been criminally indicted on drug charges arising from the same incident or circum-
stances that motivated the employer to test; cf. Hatteras v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
774 F.2d 1341, 1344 (5th Cir. 1985) (no pretermination hearing required where tele-
phone service was terminated after customer-operator of an escort service-was in-
dicted for prostitution).
I See Lewis & Lewis, Preventive Approaches: Programs in Business and In-
dustry in DRUGS AND ALCOHOL 79, 80 (A. Carmi & S. Schneider, eds. 1986); Nelson,
supra note 165, at 405. See also Exec. Order No. 12,564, 3 C.F.R. 224, 225 (1987).
1,2 See T. DENENBERG & R. DENENBERG, supra note 142, at 35-36; Nolan, Mu-
tual Respect, Understanding Combat Substance Abuse, DATA MGMT., Dec. 1985, at
18, 19.
1" See, e.g., Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Local 922, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 62 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 150, 152 (Dec. 19, 1983) (Bernhardt, Arb.).
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by allowing her both to keep her job and lose her drug dependency.
Moreover, the EAP option reduces the danger that drug testing will be
used merely as an instrument of punishment.
Legislation can make an EAP option mandatory. For example, the
New Jersey legislature recently passed a bill requiring public employ-
ers who do drug testing to grant a leave of absence for rehabilitation to
an employee whose test results are positive.1 94 But a statutory require-
ment is, obviously, not necessarily a constitutional one. Is a public em-
ployer required to offer an employee the opportunity for rehabilitation
as a matter of constitutional due process?
Analyzed by the traditional "root requirement" of procedural due
process, notice and hearing, 195 the answer appears to be a clear "no."
However, proving the employee's unwillingness or inability to stop tak-
ing drugs is part of showing her unfitness for public service."9 '
Whether the burden to prove or disprove this unfitness is on the em-
ployer or employee, the best procedure for meeting the burden is an
EAP.
Since drug addiction is a "handicap" under the Rehabilitation
Act '19 and various state handicap discrimination statutes,"9 ' employers
have a duty of reasonable accommodation to the addict's problem. 9
This statute-based duty probably requires employers to provide EAP
options.200 An expansive interpretation of the due process protection
may mean that the Constitution requires the same.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that procedural due pro-
cess requirements are flexible, adapting over time to specific situa-
tions.201 Commentators have argued that "[d]ue process need be flexible
14 See supra note 154.
195 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (quoting
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)).
19 Executive Order 12,564, aimed at eradicating drug use from the federal work-
place, recognizes the importance of such proof in determining who is unsuitable for
continued employment. See Exec. Order No. 12,564, § 5(d), 3 C.F.R. 224, 227 (1987)
(only those employees who refuse to enter rehabilitation or who resume drug use after
an initial detection are to be terminated).
197 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See, e.g., Davis v. Bucher,
451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (drug addiction is subject to Act's protection).
198 See Geidt, Drug and Alcohol Abuse in the Work Place: Balancing Employer
and Employee Rights, 11 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 181, 184 (1986) (listing statutes).
19 See 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(0 (1986). See also Geidt, supra note 198, at 185.
200 See Geidt, supra note 198, at 194.
201 See L. TRIBE, supra note 85, at 539 ("[Cjonsideration of what procedures due
process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determina-
tion of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the private
interest that has been affected by governmental action." (citing Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961))); Joint Anti-Fascist Refu-
gee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 161-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (in
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mainly in terms of the specific procedures that courts require. The val-
ues that the clause represents, on the other hand, are more enduring.
Once the values are discerned, a court's task is to assess the manner in
which these values may best be realized. 202 Do the values that the due
process clauses represent demand that a public employee not be de-
prived of her job without an opportunity to show she can stay off
drugs?
One of the dominant purposes of procedural due process is reduc-
ing the risk of factual error when deciding whether a deprivation is
justified.203 If the purpose of detecting employee drug use is to identify
those employees who pose a risk to public safety or the integrity of the
employing agency, the EAP option helps considerably to realize this
goal. Once an employee has recovered from a drug habit or other pat-
tern of abuse, she has shown that she is fit to return to duty. On the
other hand, if the employee were simply fired, the employing agency
would have no way of knowing whether or not she could have been
salvaged as an effective member of the workforce. Discharge without
the option of rehabilitation is not the best way to determine who is
permanently unsuitable for public service.
The EAP option is an appropriate procedural requirement
whether or not the initial proof of drug use raises a presumption of
future impairment. If there is no such presumption, an EAP option is
the best way for the employer to show the employee's unwillingness or
inability to stop using drugs. And if the employee is subject to such a
presumption, the EAP option is necessary because it is the only effec-
tive "hearing" by which she can overcome the presumption.
CONCLUSION
While the rulings of various courts differ as to the circumstances
under which public employers may and may not test their employees
for drug use, it is likely that many categories of public employees, espe-
cially those whose jobs directly affect public safety, will remain subject
to drug urinalysis testing. The prospect of losing one's job as the result
of being identified as an illegal drug user jeopardizes some of an indi-
vidual's most fundamental interests: income security, the opportunity
the conditions prevailing during the cold war period, designating an organization as
subversive presented an exceptional hardship to the organization requiring special pro-
cedures before the hardship was imposed).
22 Redish & Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Proce-
dural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 474 (1986).
203 See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970) (pretermination hearing
serves to prevent erroneous removal of benefits from deserving recipients).
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for fulfilling work, and the liberty to move freely in the job market.
Because of the weight of these interests, the judicial assessment of
drug testing in prisoner discipline cases2'" is not applicable to the pub-
lic employment context. Such analysis is not sensitive enough to the
questionable reliability of the scientific methods currently in use. A
careful balancing of the government interests involved against the indi-
vidual interests discounted by the risk of error, as prescribed in Ma-
thews v. Eldridge,2 " suggests that stringent confirmation requirements
must be met before any employment action begins against an employee
testing positive. Due process allows no final termination before the em-
ployee has had a full opportunity to challenge the test results.
Finally, because of the unprecedented nature of the government
effort to detect drug abuse among public employees, the traditional con-
cept of an "opportunity to be heard" should be expanded. Requiring an
employer to disprove, or offering an employee the chance to prove, her
willingness to change, before dismissing her as unsuitable for public
employment, advances the notions of factual certainty and fairness that
the constitutional guarantee of due process exists to serve.
204 See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
2oc 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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